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Abstract 
This paper reviews recent federal court rulings on section 1983 cases relating to custodial suicide.  The 
criteria for succeeding in such cases was not clearly articulated until the Farmer v. Brennan case was 
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1994.  Unfortunately for the families of deceased inmates, 
the Farmer ruling made the already challenging task of prevailing in federal court even more difficult. 
This paper includes an analysis of the defenses available to corrections personnel faced with a section 
1983 lawsuit for a correctional suicide that occurred on their watch.   
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Introduction 
When police or corrections personnel take 
custody of an alleged offender, the government 
becomes responsible for that person’s safety and 
general well-being (Estelle v. Gamble, 1976).  
Officers are responsible for not only keeping 
inmates safe from each other, but they are 
obligated to keep inmates safe from themselves 
(Collins, 1995; Hanser, 2002). Officers and 
civilian staff in prisons, jails and police lock-ups 
have to deal with the possibility that inmates 
under their supervision might attempt to take 
their own lives.  
 
Correctional staff members have a moral duty to 
provide care for inmates and work to prevent 
suicides.  Custodial suicide is a great tragedy 
that affects staff members emotionally, but there 
are also legal problems that frequently arise 
from such an event. The deceased’s family must 
struggle to understand how their relative could 
succeed in committing suicide while being 
supervised by the correctional staff.  The 
frustration on the part of the families often leads 
them to state or federal court, where they file 
civil suits for wrongful death or a violation of 
the inmate’s civil rights. Schanger (2003) 
researched litigation in large jails and state 
prison systems and found that 36 percent of 
large jail respondents and 33 percent of 
responding state prison systems had been sued 
for suicide-related issues over the past three 
years.  
 
Legal Options For Families 
The families of deceased inmates, or the inmates 
themselves in the event of an unsuccessful 
suicide attempt, who are looking for relief in 
civil court have the option of filing a tort claim 
or a civil rights claim. A tort is some injury or 
wrong for which a court provides damages or 
compensation (Anderson & Dyson, 2001), and 
this type of claim is heard in state courts.  
Wallace and Roberson (2000) identified two 
areas where torts apply to corrections officials: 
The first category is intentional torts in which 
the inmate is alleging that officials intentionally 
inflicted harm, and this includes cases involving 
false imprisonment, assault or emotional 
distress.  Second, negligence torts involve 
injuries that occurred as a result of corrections 
officials acting carelessly or providing sub-
standard care, rather than intentionally inflicting 
harm. Successful tort actions involve a 
demonstration of three elements: (1) a legal duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a 
breach of that duty, and (3) an injury as a result 
of that breach (Anderson & Dyson, 2001; 
Wallace & Roberson, 2000).  A successful tort 
action will result in a financial reward to the 
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plaintiff, and this reward can take the form of 
compensatory damages for any injuries or 
punitive damages to punish the defendant for 
improper conduct (Wallace & Roberson, 2000).  
A disadvantage to inmates in filing a tort claim 
is that attorney fees will not be awarded, nor is 
any injunctive relief available (attorneys 
generally receive payment from the money 
awarded to the plaintiff – see Anderson & 
Dyson, 2001).  Tort claims for suicide, however, 
tend to be easier for plaintiffs to win than the 
federal civil rights claims that will be explained 
next (Robertson, 1993).  
 
The other option for inmates seeking relief in 
courts is title 42, section 1983 of the U.S. Code, 
commonly referred to as “section 1983”.  This is 
the provision that allows the families of inmate 
suicide victims to sue government entities for a 
constitutional violation (Johnson, 2002).  Judges 
deciding the case of Monell v. Department of 
Social Services (1978) established that a civil 
rights violation under section 1983 occurred 
when; (1) A person was deprived of a right, 
privilege or immunity guaranteed under the 
Constitution and federal laws, and (2) The 
deprivation resulted from official policy or 
custom of a local government entity (Wallace & 
Roberson, 2000).  Wallace and Roberson (2000) 
stated that if corrections personnel operate a 
certain way and if high-ranking officials know 
of these activities, the activities can be 
considered custom.  Additionally, behavior of 
high-ranking officials might be considered 
agency custom if that behavior is repeated 
regularly, and the official is a decision-maker for 
the agency.  
 
An advantage of section 1983 claims over tort 
claims is that in addition to monetary awards, it 
is possible to win an injunction for the 
corrections department to cease to perform a 
certain practice.  Additionally, it is possible for 
plaintiffs to be awarded attorneys’ fees, rather 
than having the fees taken out of the money 
awarded to the plaintiff (Anderson & Dyson, 
2001). The remainder of this paper focuses on 
section 1983 cases relating to custodial suicides.  
 
Estelle v. Gamble And Inmates’ Rights 
To Medical Care 
The landmark case of Estelle v. Gamble (1976), 
although not a custodial suicide case, did 
recognize the provision of inmate medical 
services as an issue relating to the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Inmate Gamble injured his back 
while working in a state prison in Texas.  The 
inmate was seen by medical staff for this injury 
and others seventeen times over a three-month 
period.  During this time, the inmate was given a 
variety of medications and was excused from 
work for most of the time.  The inmate instituted 
a civil rights action under section 1983 against 
corrections officials including the chief medical 
officer of the prison hospital.  Among Gamble’s 
complaints was that he was put in isolation for 
refusing to work after the medical staff cleared 
him to work, his back was not x-rayed, and one 
of his prescriptions was not filled for four days 
(the prescription was lost). 
 
Gamble did not win, but the case is significant 
for establishing the requirements for success in 
correctional medical care cases.  The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that in order for a 
court to rule in favor of a plaintiff, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the corrections personnel 
exhibited “deliberate indifference” towards that 
person’s medical needs.  The justices explained 
that “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 
serious medical needs constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment and gave rise to a civil rights cause 
of action under 42 USCS 1983, regardless of 
whether the indifference was manifested by 
prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s 
needs or by prison guards in intentionally 
denying or delaying access to medical care of 
intentionally interfering with treatment once 
prescribed” (pp. 104-105).  The justices did note 
that inmates would not succeed in taking action 
with every claim of poor medical treatment, 
since a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
required a “wanton infliction of unnecessary 
pain.”  In other words, simple malpractice or a 
misdiagnosis was not intentional, and therefore 
did not constitute a civil rights violation.  In this 
particular case, the Texas Department of 
Corrections was not considered to be 
 114
C. Tartaro / Californian Journal of Health Promotion 2005, Volume 3, Issue 2, 113-124 
 
deliberately indifferent, since they did provide 
medical care for the inmate, and the temporary 
misplacement of the prescription was ruled an 
accident rather than a deliberate attempt to harm 
the inmate.  
 
The Estelle case involved an inmate who was 
complaining about the care he received for a 
physical ailment, but the Supreme Court’s ruling 
had an impact on litigation possibilities for both 
the physical and mental health care of inmates.  
Hanser (2002) noted that following the Estelle 
ruling; several lower courts began to include 
mental health care as a serious medical need for 
inmates. The Estelle court recognized that 
deliberate indifference towards inmate medical 
care is an issue covered by the Eighth 
Amendment, but the court did not provide a 
definition for deliberate indifference.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified this matter in Farmer v. 
Brennan (1994).  
 
Farmer v. Brennan And Establishing 
Deliberate Indifference 
Farmer v. Brennan (1994) involved an inmate-
inmate assault rather than a suicide. The case 
involved a biological male who had undergone 
estrogen therapy, received silicone breast 
implants, submitted to an unsuccessful testicle-
removal surgery and had been taking hormonal 
drugs smuggled into the prison.  In addition to 
the biological changes that the inmate 
underwent, he also wore his clothes in a 
feminine manner.  Farmer spent most of his 
sentence in segregation for his own safety. He 
was transferred to another prison due to 
disciplinary reasons, and was placed among the 
general population.  Farmer voiced no objections 
to this placement, but he later claimed that 
within two weeks he was beaten and raped by 
another inmate in his cell (Farmer v. Brennan, 
1994).  
 
Farmer sued, claiming that his placement in the 
general population constituted deliberate 
indifference, since the prison administrators 
should have known that a transsexual would be 
in danger if placed in the general population.  In 
other words, the plaintiff was arguing for a 
“purely objective test” for determining liability, 
meaning that the defendants should be held 
accountable whether they knew of the risk or 
should have known of that risk.  The court did 
not rule in favor of the plaintiff but did explain 
under what conditions a prison official can be 
held responsible for injury to an inmate.  Justice 
Souter, who wrote the majority opinion, stated 
that “A prison official cannot be found liable 
under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless 
the official knows of and disregards an excessive 
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must 
both be aware of facts from which the inference 
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.” (Farmer v. Brennan, 1994; p. 837) In 
other words, it is not enough for there to be an 
obvious risk to an inmate’s health and safety 
(objective test).  If such a risk exists, officials 
may not be held responsible unless the plaintiff 
can prove that they were aware of the risk.  
According to Hanser (2002) this represented a 
shift in the standards traditionally used by the 
court in determining reckless knowledge. Prior 
to the Farmer decision, some, but not all, courts 
used an objective standard which required that 
the plaintiff demonstrate that officials should 
have known of a problem.  The standard set by 
the justices deciding the Farmer case was for 
both an objective and subjective test.  In order to 
be successful, the plaintiff must show that the 
deprivation suffered by the inmate is 
“objectively, sufficiently serious” (p. 823), 
thereby fulfilling the objective standard.  For the 
subjective standard, by contrast, the plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that the deprivation was 
“unnecessary and wanton” and the defendants 
must have held a “sufficiently culpable state of 
mind” (p. 823) meaning that the plaintiff needs 
to show that the officials actually knew of the 
danger to the inmate and deliberately chose to 
ignore it. 
 
According to the standards set in the Farmer 
ruling, officials may not be found to have 
exhibited deliberate indifference even if the 
inmate suffers harm, provided that the 
administration can demonstrate that they did 
make a reasonable response to the risk.  Only if 
an official knows of a risk to an inmate and fails 
to act or act in an unconscionable manner will 
the court rule against the corrections employee. 
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Souter explained “An act or omission 
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant 
risk of harm might well be something society 
wishes to discourage and if harm does result 
society might well wish to assure compensation. 
But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant 
risk that he should have perceived but did not, 
while no cause for commendation, cannot under 
our cases be condemned as the infliction of 
punishment.” (p. 826) 
 
To summarize, in the wake of the Farmer 
decision, plaintiffs have to establish three sets of 
facts when demonstrating that correctional staff 
were deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s 
medical need. First, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the deceased had a “serious 
medical need.” Second, the defendants must 
have been aware of that need, and third, the 
defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to that 
known medical need.  All three of these factors 
must be established in order to establish a 
constitutional deprivation.  
 
Defenses Against A Section 1983 Claim 
Summary Judgment and Immunity 
Section 1983 suicide litigation cases are 
frequently dismissed before they reach trial due 
to a grant of summary judgment, or a successful 
claim of immunity by corrections officials.  
Summary judgment is granted if the court 
decides that “the plaintiff has failed to prove that 
a genuine issue of material fact exists between 
the parties” (Johnson, 2002, p. 1241). During 
this phase, the court views the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the 
judge will discard claims that he or she believes 
are not supported by the facts before they 
proceed to trial (Johnson, 2002). 
 
Government officials are immune from litigation 
under certain circumstances. Judges, for 
example, have absolute immunity, protecting 
them from all lawsuits pertaining to their work 
(Anderson & Dyson, 2001). Corrections officials 
are not eligible for such protection, but they may 
make a successful argument for qualified 
immunity under certain circumstances.  
Government employees who are not violating 
clearly established constitutional rights, which a 
reasonable person should be aware of, tend to 
receive qualified immunity.  The question for 
the courts to determine is whether the employee 
knew or should have known that the action in 
question violated inmates’ rights.  Officials can 
claim to be operating in good faith if they can 
demonstrate that they were working to adhere to 
prison regulations and constitutional protections 
(Anderson & Dyson, 2001).   
 
The standard for qualified immunity for 
government employees was articulated in a case 
involving the work of school officials.  In Wood 
v. Strickland (1975) the Supreme Court Justices 
heard arguments about whether school 
administrators who had expelled students for 
bringing alcohol to school should be granted 
qualified immunity for performing their duties in 
good faith.  The Court decided that in 
determining good faith, both objective and 
subjective standards should be used.  
Specifically, Justice White wrote in the majority 
opinion (p. 322) that: 
 
The official himself must be acting 
sincerely and with a belief that he is 
doing right, but an act violating a 
student's constitutional rights can be no 
more justified by ignorance or 
disregard of settled, indisputable law on 
the part of one entrusted with 
supervision of students' daily lives than 
by the presence of actual malice.   To 
be entitled to a special exemption from 
the categorical remedial language of § 
1983 in a case in which his action 
violated a student's constitutional 
rights, a school board member, who has 
voluntarily undertaken the task of 
supervising the operation of the school 
and the activities of the students, must 
be held to a standard of conduct based 
not only on permissible intentions, but 
also on knowledge of the basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights of 
his charges.  
 
In other words, the professional is expected 
to have a general knowledge of basic rights 
for the population they supervise.  
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Defenses Relating To Farmer v. Brennan 
Justice Souter acknowledged that three possible 
defenses for prison administrations would arise 
out of the Farmer decision.  The first defense is 
that prison officials can show that they were 
unaware of the facts indicating that the inmate 
was in danger.  Assuming that the first defense 
is not possible, the second defense is that while 
the administration acknowledges being aware of 
the facts, they believed that the risk was either 
insubstantial or nonexistent. Third, officials can 
claim that they did provide a reasonable 
response to the risk, but the injury occurred 
anyway, despite the efforts of the administration.  
Examples of each of these defenses, successful 
and unsuccessful, are provided below.  
 
Defense 1: Officials Were Unaware of the 
Facts Indicating the Inmate was in Danger. 
Although the aforementioned shift from the 
objective standard to subjective was a blow to 
inmates wishing to institute a civil rights action, 
the Farmer court did provide inmates with some 
hope for future cases.  The court’s ruling seemed 
to signal the end of the “individual specific” 
rule. Under this rule, the plaintiff would have to 
demonstrate that the corrections administration 
knew about a specific threat to that particular 
inmate (Hanser, 2002). In an analysis of the 
impact of the Farmer case on custodial suicide 
liability cases, Robertson (2004) stated that if an 
official is pleading ignorance of a risk to the 
court, the court can conclude that the risk was so 
clear that the official must have been aware of 
the danger.  For example, risk of assault for an 
inmate can be derived from more general 
information, such as evidence that a given area 
inside the jail was a known trouble spot for 
violence, rather than specific threats against a 
particular inmate (Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 
1995).   
 
Hanser (2002) argued that while Farmer v. 
Brennan initially appeared to benefit inmates 
when it jettisoned the individual specific rule, 
subsequent rulings revealed that the courts have 
been inconsistent in abiding by the Farmer 
court’s decision on this. Hale v. Tallapoosa 
County is an example of the lower courts 
adhering to the removal of the individual 
specific rule.  Inmate Hale, who was being held 
for failing to appear on a marijuana charge, was 
locked in a cell with several inmates, some of 
whom were being held for violent offenses.  
Hale was beaten by these inmates, and he 
brought a civil rights suit claiming that the jail 
officers were deliberately indifferent to the risk 
of violence in that part of the jail.  When the 
corrections officials sought to have the case 
dismissed, the court declined to do so.  The court 
ruled that although the administrator had no 
knowledge of specific threats against Hale, 
violence had been a regular occurrence in that 
part of the jail, so the administrator knew of a 
substantial generalized risk to Hale and other 
inmates housed there.  Despite awareness of this 
risk, the administrator did not take any action to 
prevent violence in that part of the jail.  Since 
the court ruled that the administrator was aware 
of the risk and disregarded it, this amounted to 
deliberate indifference.  
 
While the court deciding Hale v. Tallapoosa 
County (1995) applied a more general standard 
in determining whether the defendants were 
aware of the risk to inmates’ health and safety, 
some courts have continued to use the individual 
specific requirement. In Frake v. City of 
Chicago (2000), the inmate’s family sued the 
city following his suicide. The family noted that 
there were twenty suicides and 163 suicide 
attempts, all by hanging, in the jail from 
December 4, 1990 through November 18, 1997.  
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the jail 
did nothing about the horizontal metal bars in 
the cells that could be used for hanging.  Despite 
the evidence that the administration was aware 
of the general risk of suicide by hanging for 
inmates in the jail, the court ruled that there was 
no evidence that inmate Frake himself was 
suicidal, therefore, the court ruled in favor of the 
defendants.   
 
Another example of courts continuing to use the 
individual-specific was provided by the United 
States District Court of Michigan, Southern 
Division. The court ruled that despite the 
custodial and medical staff’s knowledge of an 
inmate’s mental illness, there is no evidence 
indicating that the staff was aware of a suicidal 
threat.  In other words, the plaintiff might be 
able to establish that the staff should have 
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known that she was suicidal, but the case could 
not proceed, since she did not demonstrate that 
they actually did know that she was suicidal 
(House v. County of Macomb, 2004). 
 
Defense 2: The Administration Acknow-
ledged Being Aware of the Facts Indicating 
Possible Danger, but they Believed the Risk 
was either Insubstantial or Nonexistent. 
Corrections officials sometimes become aware 
of past suicide attempts or threats of an 
upcoming attempt and for a variety of reasons 
do not interpret that information as an immediate 
problem for the inmate.  Robertson (1993) noted 
that case law requires a four-prong test for 
satisfying the “awareness” factor listed as the 
second requirement for establishing deliberate 
indifference.  The four facts that plaintiffs need 
to establish are; (1) Inmate previously threatened 
or attempted suicide; (2) The prior threat or 
attempt is known to defendants; (3) The prior 
threat or attempt was somewhat recent; and (4) 
The prior threat or attempt appeared genuine.  If 
any one of these facts is not proven by the 
plaintiff, the court will find in favor of the 
defendant.   
 
In Turney v. Waterbury (2004), Turney told 
officers in the Pennington County Jail that he 
was going to “hang it up.”  When he was 
transferred to the Bennett County Jail three days 
later, the sheriff who conducted the inmate 
transport told the supervisor at the Bennett 
County Jail about the threat of suicide.  The 
sheriff also informed the supervisor of Turney’s 
comment that if he received a long prison 
sentence, he would kill himself and someone 
else.  Before leaving for the night, the supervisor 
told an officer to keep an eye on Turney, but that 
the officer should not go into his cell alone for 
any reason. The officer was not given an 
explanation for this warning. For this reason, the 
officer did not attempt to cut down Turney when 
he was found hanging in his cell.  The court 
denied summary judgment to the defendants’ 
due to the fact that corrections officials were 
aware of the suicidal risk, yet they did not pass 
that information to the officers watching the 
inmate.  
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit heard the case of Cavalieri v. Shepard 
(2003) and concluded that the arresting officer 
(Shepard) was deliberately indifferent in 
neglecting to inform the jail staff that Cavalieri 
was suicidal.  The officer was at the crime scene 
when Cavalieri was holding his girlfriend 
hostage, and he threatened to kill her and 
himself.  When they arrived at the jail, Cavalieri 
asked Shepard if he could speak to a counselor.  
Despite the officer’s assurances that he would 
arrange that, it never happened.  Additionally, 
Shepard was told by the inmate’s mother that 
her son was in a fragile mental state and had 
called the crisis hotline the night before.  She 
also told the officer that her son had been on 
suicide watch at the jail the previous month.  
Shepard claimed that after conducting interviews 
with Cavalieri, the inmate seemed fine.  He was 
later placed in a cell with a telephone and a 
strong cord.  The inmate wrapped the cord 
around his neck, thereby depriving himself of 
oxygen.  Brain damage typically begins to occur 
after a person has been deprived of oxygen for 
approximately four minutes.  As a result of the 
deprivation, Cavalieri suffered severe brain 
damages and remains in a vegetative state. The 
court ruled that Shepard should not have relied 
exclusively on his impressions of the inmate 
during the interviews, but should have used the 
information obtained at the crime scene and 
from Cavalieri’s mother. The information from 
the crime scene and that provided by the 
inmate’s mother was enough to demonstrate that 
at least one government official involved in this 
case was aware of the danger to the inmate. 
Once Shepard became aware of the fact that 
Cavalieri was suicidal, he, as a sworn officer, 
was obligated to take steps to protect the inmate 
from himself.  Documents relating to the case 
made no mention of whether the jail had a 
suicide prevention policy that covered 
communication issues, but the breakdown in 
communication was still viewed by the courts as 
a demonstration of deliberate indifference.   
 
In a similar case, a sheriff and deputy were 
denied qualified immunity when an offender 
arrested for attempted murder-suicide was 
placed in a cell with tie-off points (places where 
an inmate can attach a noose).  An inmate had 
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previously committed suicide in that cell by 
using those tie-off points.  The inmate was given 
a sheet and placed in the cell without 
supervision for at least 45 minutes (Jacobs v. 
West Feliciana Sheriff’s Department, 2000).  In 
this case, the inmate was clearly suicidal, having 
attempted suicide at the crime scene (the gun 
jammed), but was placed in a cell with the tools 
to commit suicide and more than enough time to 
do it.  The court ruled that given the officers’ 
knowledge that the inmate was suicidal and that 
inmates had previously committed suicide in 
that particular cell, there was a genuine issue of 
fact that needed to be addressed by a jury.  The 
court ruled that the case should proceed to trial 
instead of granting the officers immunity for 
their actions.  
 
The City of Shreveport, Louisiana was recently 
ordered to pay three million dollars to the family 
of an inmate who hanged herself after she 
warned the staff that she would commit suicide.  
She did so by using her pants to hang herself 
from a shower rod (Hayes, 1999).  The inmate 
had apparently warned jail staff that she was 
suicidal.  Despite this, she was placed alone in a 
cell. She was not given a psychiatric assessment, 
nor did the jail implement any suicide 
prevention measures.   
 
In Boncher v. Brown County (2001), the primary 
issue to be resolved was whether the inmate was 
joking when he told the screening officer that he 
had attempted suicide “a couple days ago.”  
Boncher immediately added that he was fine 
now, and according to the booking officer, he 
seemed jovial and cooperative. Boncher 
committed suicide 45 minutes after he was 
placed in a regular cell instead of an area with 
close observation. The court ruled that the 
plaintiff lacked any evidence to indicate that 
anyone in booking thought that Boncher’s 
response to the suicide question was serious.   
 
The defense that an inmate was joking was also 
successful in one Iowa case.  Sam Bell was 
arrested for driving while under the influence.  
During his intake screening, Bell said that he 
would shoot himself.  The admissions staff did 
not take him seriously, so she did not check the 
box on the intake form that indicated that the 
inmate was suicidal.  After Bell’s suicide, his 
family sued the county.  The judge did deny a 
grant of summary judgment to the defendant on 
the grounds that the inmate made a threat, and 
the threat was ignored by a correctional staff 
member (Bell v. County of Washington, Iowa, 
1990).  This denial was, however, overturned on 
appeal because the court believed that the 
inmate’s joke was a “single off-hand comment 
about shooting oneself when no gun is 
available” and that “cannot reasonably constitute 
a serious suicide threat” (Bell v. Stigers, 1991. p. 
1344). 
 
The courts will only consider a previous suicide 
attempt a warning sign if the attempt was recent.  
In Holland v. City of Atmore (2001) Holland was 
taken to the hospital for a suicide attempt in 
December 1997. He was arrested and placed in 
jail in February 1998, where he was put on 
suicide watch for banging his head against the 
bars.  In July 1998, he committed suicide in the 
local jail.  The officer who handled the 911 call 
for the 1997 suicide attempt was also the jailer 
on the night of his suicide.  The officer was 
unaware of the February head-banging incident, 
but he did know about the incident in December 
of 1997.  The court found that the December 
suicide attempt did not make the risk so obvious 
as to require a special duty of care for the 
inmate. The court concluded that “An individual 
that threatens to attempt suicide has 
unequivocally expressed an immediate desire or 
intent to end his life, and that desire or intent 
may readily be assumed to persist only until the 
passions provoking is have cooled sufficiently 
for reason and self-love to regain primacy. A 
strong likelihood of self-annihilation may 
remain for periods of a few hours, or even a few 
days after a suicide attempt or threat, but the 
plaintiffs have identified no support for the 
proposition that an individual may remain on the 
brink of suicide for months at a time, much less 
that Holland did so (p. 1314).” 
 
A series of recorded suicide attempts, however, 
is considered enough information to warrant 
medical care and proper supervision.  In Hall v. 
Ryan (1992), the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied a request for qualified immunity, 
since Clifford Howard Jr. had been arrested 
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twenty-eight times and detained by the police 
nine times.  Nine months before the suicide 
attempt that left him in a coma, Howard was 
arrested and threatened to commit suicide.  
Consistent with the Municipal Jail and Lockup 
Standards, he was taken directly to the hospital.  
That arrest report contained information about 
his threat, hospitalization and several previous 
suicide attempts. The police chief met with 
Howard’s mother a few months before his final 
suicide attempts. The mother told the chief of his 
problems and suicidal condition, plus she gave 
the chief documents pertaining to his condition. 
This prior experience with the detainee, 
combined with his erratic behavior the night he 
attempted suicide was determined to be enough 
evidence to have a jury trial.   
 
The Estelle court did emphasize that medical 
mistakes do not amount to deliberate 
indifference, nor is the choice of one medically 
reasonable treatment over another grounds for a 
lawsuit.  Exceptionally poor medical care that 
results in death, however, does meet the 
deliberate indifference standard. Billy Wade 
Montgomery committed suicide in the Reception 
and Guidance Center in Southern Michigan 
shortly after being removed from suicide watch.  
A psychologist (McCrary) put him on suicide 
watch but did not put the report in the inmate’s 
file.  When Montgomery received a routine 
physical the next day, the physician took him off 
suicide watch, because he did not see the 
psychologist’s report.  After the inmate was 
removed from suicide watch, the psychologist 
met with Montgomery again.  Montgomery said 
that he was ‘no longer suicidal.’  Despite 
McCrary’s belief that he was suicidal the 
previous day and his knowledge that 
Montgomery was having trouble with other 
inmates, he chose to keep him off suicide watch. 
Following Montgomery’s death, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the case 
should proceed to a jury trial, since the inmate 
was removed from suicide watch without the 
psychologist making any “reasoned assessment 
or evaluation of the patient’s suicide risk” 
(Comstock v. McCrary, 2001, p. 710). 
 
Defense 3: Officials did provide a reasonable 
response to the risk, but the injury occurred 
anyway, despite the efforts of the 
administration. Corrections departments might 
be able to clear themselves of wrong-doing, at 
least in Federal Court, by demonstrating that 
while they were not successful in preventing the 
suicide attempt, they did respond to the inmate’s 
suicide risk. The federal court distinction is 
made here, because suing for negligence in state 
court is easier for the plaintiff.  For negligence, 
the law allows for a broader definition of “who 
is owed a duty to be protected from suicide” and 
“it also requires a higher standard of care in 
discharging that duty” (see Robertson, 1993, p. 
828). 
 
The case of Williams v. Mehra (1999) illustrates 
a successful application of this defense. Inmate 
Wade had attempted suicide by hoarding his 
anti-depressant medication and overdosing on it.  
The jail responded to this by prescribing him a 
liquid medication. Wade was under the care of a 
psychiatrist who adjusted his medication in 
order to help him.  During the process of 
adjusting his medication, Wade was prescribed 
pills, but was ordered to take them in a “pill 
line” where ingesting medications was 
supervised by a nurse.  Wade managed to 
deceive the nurse into thinking that he was 
taking the medication when he was actually 
hording it. He later committed suicide by 
overdosing this medication. The court granted 
the correctional staff involved in this case 
qualified immunity, since they were making an 
effort to treat and supervise the inmate. 
 
Another example of a municipality successfully 
arguing that they provided the inmate treatment 
can be found in Serafin v. City of Johnstown 
(2003). Joseph Serafin was put on suicide watch, 
and in this particular facility, suicide watch 
meant that the clerk would monitor the inmate 
through closed-circuit television while attending 
to her usual clerical duties at her desk.  The clerk 
was monitoring Serafain and other inmates by 
periodically switching the channel on the 
television to check on each inmate.  When the 
clerk switched to check on Serafain, she found 
him hanging in his cell. As a result of this 
suicide attempt, he suffered severe brain 
damage. Serafin’s family sued, claiming 
deliberate indifference, but the US Court of 
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Appeals, Third Circuit granted the defendants 
summary judgment. The court stated that while 
the jail’s prevention policy could have been 
better, the staff did follow the policy, and the 
injury occurred despite the staff’s efforts.   
Unfortunately, the outcome of this and the case 
that follows seems to indicate that corrections 
agencies might be better able to avoid 
compensating victims if they either have a poor 
written suicide prevention policy, or none at all.  
While the City of Johnstown was successful in 
the previously mentioned lawsuit, the case of 
Sisk v. Manzanares (2002) provides an example 
of how a department with a more comprehensive 
prevention policy appears to be at a higher risk 
of losing in court.  
 
Inmate Sisk’s mother called Department of 
Corrections sergeant Joel Manzanares to express 
her concern that her son was suicidal.  Sergeant 
Manzanares ordered one of his officers to search 
Sisk’s cell, and the officer found a tear-stained 
suicide note.  The sergeant ordered Sisk 
removed from his cell and placed in “hard 
lockdown,” a cement cell that had no protrusions 
that could be used to attach a noose.  This was 
contrary to DOC custom, since suicidal inmates 
were typically put in rubber cells (that afford 
more protection for the inmate), and the only 
time “hard lockdown” was used was when the 
rubber cells were already occupied.  The cell 
where Sisk was placed did have a metal plate 
attached to the wall.  Also contrary to DOC 
custom, the sergeant ordered that the inmate be 
given a woolen blanket rather than a tear-away 
paper shroud or a suicide-prevention blanket 
(the department’s stock of suicide prevention 
blankets had run out).  The cell where Sisk was 
placed could not be viewed completely from its 
window, but the officers could see the entire cell 
with the security camera.  No one was scheduled 
to watch the security monitors on third shift, and 
the officers did not do their 15-minute wellness 
checks on the inmate as required.  The inmate 
was able to move the metal plate in the cell, 
attach the blanket to it, and commit suicide.  The 
court denied the defendant’s summary judgment, 
due to the evidence that the sergeant failed to 
abide by the facility’s prevention program (Sisk 
v. Manzanares, 2002). 
 
Correctional Medical Services (CMS) was 
ordered to pay 1.75 million dollars in 
compensatory and punitive damages in 2004 for 
failing to follow its own written suicide 
prevention policies (Woodward v. Correctional 
Medical Services, 2004). Justin Farver 
committed suicide in the Lake County Jail in 
Illinois.  During the trial, two nurses testified 
that CMS routinely had a month-long backlog of 
intake evaluations of inmates.  When Farver was 
incarcerated, a nurse who had never done an 
intake screening before was told to do it.  The 
nurse had not completed a single element of the 
nurse orientation checklist, nor did she complete 
the 90-day orientation program.  When asked if 
he had thoughts of killing himself, Farver said 
that he did, and the nurse noted that he had a 
history of psychiatric treatment and suicide 
attempts.  The nurse did not report this history in 
the intake summary, nor did she notify the shift 
commander or refer him for a mental health 
evaluation.  During Farver’s time at the jail, both 
the social worker and psychiatrist also noted that 
the inmate was suicidal, but neither 
recommended a suicide watch. The court 
concluded that had the staff followed the CMS 
policies, the inmate would have received mental 
health treatment and been properly supervised.   
 
Failure to stop a suicide attempt while in 
progress has been interpreted by the courts as 
failure to respond to a serious medical need. The 
courts have ruled against prison and jail systems 
when officers have failed to promptly cut down 
inmates who have been found hanging in their 
cells.  The failure to immediately respond to this 
potentially deadly situation has been interpreted 
by the courts as meeting the deliberate 
indifference requirement (see Owens v. City of 
Philadelphia, 1998; Turney v. Waterbury, 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
Section 1983 lawsuits involving custodial 
suicide were not an option until the late 1970s.  
Even though the inmate bringing the Estelle v. 
Gamble (1976) lawsuit lost the case, it 
represented a victory for inmates as the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized medical care as an 
issue to be considered under the Eighth 
Amendment.  The absence of a formal definition 
of deliberate indifference following the Estelle 
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ruling resulted in some confusion as to whether 
the lower courts should be using an objective or 
subjective test in determining whether 
corrections personnel knew of the suicide risk 
for the inmate-in-question.   The establishment 
of criteria for correctional staff’s deliberate 
indifference to an inmate’s health and safety 
needs was not addressed until 1994.   
 
The Farmer court’s decision to require a 
subjective test in determining whether 
corrections personnel were aware of the suicide 
risk made it even more difficult for failures of 
inmates to succeed in section 1983 cases. 
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that an inmate had a 
serious medical need, then they must show that 
specific correctional personnel knew of that need 
and intentionally disregarded that risk to the 
inmate’s health. The absence of any one of these 
factors will likely result in the case being thrown 
out before it reaches a jury.  The Farmer court 
stated that deliberate indifference “describes a 
state of mind more blameworthy than 
negligence” (p. 1978), since negligence includes 
inadvertent behavior on the part of corrections 
officers (Kappeler, Vaughn, & Del Carmen, 
1991).  
 
The initial optimism felt by inmates’ rights 
attorneys and deceased inmates’ families about 
the removal of the individual-specific 
requirement for suicide cases waned when it 
became clear that the courts would not be 
uniform in their rulings on this subject.  Instead 
of allowing for the determination of suicide risk 
based on more general information, such as 
knowledge of past suicides in a part of a facility, 
or that a particular inmate is mentally ill, some 
post-Farmer courts have continued to use the 
individual-specific rule. 
 
Since the Farmer ruling, federal courts have 
ruled that history of a previous suicide attempt 
might not be enough to warrant extra care by 
corrections personnel if the attempt occurred 
eight months prior to the successful suicide 
attempt in jail (Holland v. City of Atmore 2001). 
The courts have also indicated that acting in 
accordance with a facility’s suicide prevention 
policy is enough to prevent the staff from being 
held accountable for the inmate’s death.  The 
problem is that the courts are willing to rule this 
way even if they determine that the prevention 
policy is a poor one (Serafin v. City of 
Johnstown, 2003).   
 
The examples presented here illustrate that the 
families of inmates face a difficult task in 
convincing the federal courts that corrections 
personnel should be held responsible for the 
self-inflicted deaths of inmates.  Even if the 
plaintiffs can provide convincing evidence that 
the staff was aware of a suicidal threat or a 
history of suicide attempts, it might not be 
enough to win in court.  The defendants might 
also prevail if they can demonstrate that they did 
make some effort to prevent the suicide -even if 
that effort was insufficient.   
 
Not all custodial suicides are preventable. 
Inmates have all day and night to work on ways 
to harm themselves or others, and some suicides 
are going to occur despite the best efforts of 
corrections staff members.  The federal courts, 
however, have given police and corrections 
departments such latitude that it is very rare that 
inmates’ families receive any compensation for 
supervision and treatment that even some federal 
judges have admitted is poor.  These courts are 
not able to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, because 
the standard for deliberate indifference is so high 
and difficult to achieve.  
 
Litigation is one way to address the problem of 
custodial suicide by convincing corrections 
agencies that they need to improve their 
supervision of inmates.  A majority of jails and 
prisons throughout the United States that have 
established training programs for staff and 
comprehensive suicide prevention programs for 
the inmates. The National Center on 
Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) listed 
essential components of any suicide prevention 
plan, including: prevention training for 
correctional, medical and mental health staff, 
intake screening, procedures for referral to 
mental health and/or medical personnel, re-
assessment of inmates following a crisis period, 
effective communication between staff members 
involved with the inmate, supervision and safe 
housing options for suicidal inmates, timely 
medical intervention, proper reporting 
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procedures, and a review of suicides after they 
have occurred (Hayes, 1999).  Development of a 
comprehensive suicide prevention plan, proper 
training, and encouragement from administration 
can prevent suicides and the litigation that tends 
to follow these events. 
 
References 
Anderson, J. F., & Dyson, L. (2001). Legal rights of prisoners. Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America. 
Collins, W. C. (1995). The court’s role in shaping prison suicide policy. In L. M. Hayes (Ed.), Prison 
suicide: An overview and guide to prevention (pp. 58-67). Washington, DC: Department of 
Justice, National Issue of Corrections. 
Hanser, R. D. (2002). Inmate suicide in prisons: an analysis of legal liability under 42 USC Section 1983. 
The Prison Journal, 82, 459-477. 
Hayes, L. M. (1999). Suicide in adult correctional facilities: key ingredients to prevention and 
overcoming the obstacles. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 27, 260-268. 
Hayes, L. (2004). News from around the country. Jail Suicide/Mental Health Update 13, 14-15. 
Johnson, C. (2002). Mental health care policies in jail systems: Suicide in the eighth amendment. 
University of California Davis Law Review, 35, 1227-1260.  
Kappeler, V. E., Vaughn, M. S., & Del Carmen, R. V. (1991). Death in detention: An analysis of police 
liability for negligent failure to prevent suicide. Journal of Criminal Justice, 19, 381-393. 
Robertson, J. E. (1993). Fatal custody: A reassessment of section 1983 liability for custodial suicide. 
University of Toledo Law Review, 24, 807-830. 
Robertston, J. (2004). The impact of Farmer v. Brennan on jailer’s personal liability for custodial suicide: 
ten years on. Jail Suicide/Mental Health Update, 13, 1-5. 
Schlanger, M. (2003). Inmate litigation: results of a national survey. Large Jail Network Annual 
Exchange, 1-12. 
Wallace, H., & Roberson, C. (2000). Legal aspects of corrections. Incline Village, NV: Copperhouse 
Publishing. 
 
Cases Cited 
Bell v. County of Washington, Iowa, 741 F. Supp. 1354 (1990) 
Bell v. Stigers, 937 F. 2d 1340 (1991) 
Boncher v. Brown County, 272 F. 3d 484 (2001) 
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F. 3d 616 (2003) 
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F. 3d 693 (2001) 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) 
Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F. 3d 779 (2000) 
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F. 3d 1579 (1995) 
Hall v. Ryan, 957 F. 2d 402 (1992) 
Holland v. City of Atmore, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (2001) 
House v. County of Macomb, 303 F. Supp. 2d 850 (2004) 
Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Department, 228 F. 3d 388 (2000) 
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
Owens v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 373 (1998) 
Serafin v. City of Johnstown, 53 Fed. Appx. 211 (2003) 
Sisk v. Manzanares, 262 F. supp 2d 1162 (2002) 
Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F. 3d 756 (2004) 
Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685 (1999) 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
 123
C. Tartaro / Californian Journal of Health Promotion 2005, Volume 3, Issue 2, 113-124 
 
 
 Author Information 
Christine Tartaro, Ph.D. 
Richard Stockton College 
E-Mail: Christine.Tartaro@stockton.edu
 
 
 124
